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Abstract
A large Midwestern university has recently acquired Cirrus SR20 aircraft to replace an aging Piper PA28-161 fleet. The upgrade to new
and more advanced Cirrus aircraft has led to major changes in the flight program curriculum. New training techniques, guidelines, and
operating procedures have been introduced to facilitate a successful transition. This study compared contributing factors to fatal accidents
in SR20 and PA28-161 aircraft to determine if there are new risks associated with the subject fleet change. Using National Transportation
Safety Board data, this study examined probable cause and other pertinent data from fatal accidents over the past ten years. The data was
statistically analyzed to determine if there is any correlation between contributing factors for the two aircraft types. This analysis will help
university leaders identify new risks facing participants in the flight program. Recommendations based on the findings are offered with
the intent of reducing the level of new risk associated with the fleet replacement.
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Introduction
Within the aviation industry, automated systems and digital avionics continue to replace more conventional, analog
instrument suites. In July 2010, a major Midwestern university replaced its Piper PA28-161 fleet with Cirrus SR20 aircraft,
introducing modern aviation technology into the flight program (Schenke, 2010). The introduction of this technically
advanced aircraft (TAA) has brought about many changes to the university’s flight program. This fleet replacement has
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resulted in differences in training techniques, program
rules, risk mitigation, and general operations. University
faculty, staff, and students continue to adapt to the new
aircraft and become more proficient each semester.
The Cirrus SR20 is representative of technological
advances that have taken place in general aviation aircraft.
While both the SR20 and PA28-161 are four seat, single
engine aircraft, significant differences exist in the type of
instrumentation each has. The SR20 has digital avionics,
commonly called a glass cockpit, while the PA28-161 has
analog instrumentation. The SR20 is classified as a TAA,
in part, due to its advanced Garmin G1000 avionics suite
and automated systems. Along with these differences, the
SR20 has the added safety feature of a ballistic parachute
designed to allow the aircraft to descend safely in the event
of a loss of control or catastrophic airframe failure (Cirrus
Aircraft, 2011). Even though both the PA28-161 and SR20
are considered by the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) to be in the same category and class, enough
differences exist between the two to warrant an examina-
tion of risk associated with operating the SR20 aircraft’s
glass cockpit and automation.
The purpose of this study was to determine if there are
differences in the most frequent contributing factors leading
to fatal accidents in PA28-161 and SR20 aircraft operated
in the United States over the past 10 years. The findings of
this study will enable flight training providers to make
safety-related decisions based on a comparison of the
previous and new aircraft fleet. It is hypothesized that there
is a greater frequency of accidents as a result of pilot error
in the SR20, when compared to the PA28-161, due to its
advanced avionics suite.
Accident Comparison: Glass Cockpit-Equipped Aircraft vs.
Conventional Aircraft
The target university’s flight department, until recently,
has provided flight training in aircraft with conventional
analog instrumentation and very little automation. The
flight training department’s operating procedures, flight
instruction techniques, and safety considerations reflect
experience gained from operating these types of aircraft for
many years. The introduction of the Cirrus SR20, which
employs a digital avionics suite, commonly called a glass
cockpit, and high levels of automation, necessitates a
thorough review of literature and risk analysis to determine
what changes must be made to the current flight
curriculum. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), aircraft
manufacturers, and academics have examined the safety
impact of increased automation and glass cockpits.
Findings from these investigations suggest that while glass
cockpits and automation may be beneficial to pilots and
reduce workload, they can also increase the chance of
accident or incident if the pilot is not proficient with the
systems (NTSB, 2010; Baxter, Besnard, & Riley, 2007). To
reduce the risk of accident in these more advanced aircraft,
pilots must have a firm understanding of how the avionics
and automation work.
Transport category aircraft have been equipped with
digital instrumentation for many years but electronic
displays have become standard for general aviation aircraft
only in the past decade. The now common use of glass
cockpits in light aircraft prompted the NTSB to examine
the associated safety benefits and risks. In 2010, the NTSB
completed a study focusing on how the transition to glass
cockpits has affected the safety of light aircraft. The NTSB
relied on manufacturer records, aircraft investigation
information, and general aviation activity to compile a list
of findings (NTSB, 2010). One of the major conclusions of
the study was that aircraft accident and activity data
showed a decrease in total accident rates but an increase in
fatal accident rates for glass cockpit-equipped aircraft
compared to conventionally-equipped aircraft (NTSB,
2010). The report suggests that the introduction of glass
cockpits has not resulted in a measurable improvement in
safety when compared to similar aircraft with analog
instruments. The study also revealed that accidents
involving aircraft equipped with glass cockpits tend to be
associated with personal/business flights, longer flights,
instrument flight plans, and single pilot operations, while
accidents involving conventionally-equipped aircraft were
more likely to be associated with instructional flights,
shorter flights, and two-pilot operations (NTSB, 2010).
A significant finding of the NTSB’s safety report was that
training in conventional cockpits does not fully prepare pilots
to operate aircraft with glass cockpits. Furthermore, the
NTSB states that the FAA does not assess a pilot’s
knowledge of glass cockpit instrumentation and has no
equipment-specific training requirements. These findings
have led the NTSB to conclude that pilots may be poorly
trained or incompetent to fly aircraft with glass cockpits when
transitioning from more conventional aircraft (NTSB, 2010).
The NTSB study identified two safety issues: ‘‘The need
for pilots to have sufficient equipment-specific knowledge
and proficiency to safely operate aircraft equipped with
glass cockpit avionics; and the need to capture maintenance
and operational information in order to assess the reliability
of glass cockpit avionics in light aircraft’’ (NTSB, 2010).
Six recommendations were made as a result of the NTSB
safety study, including revisions to airman knowledge tests
to incorporate questions on glass cockpits and suggestions
on the implementation of glass cockpit training. The NTSB
also called on manufacturers to improve or add sections on
electronic flight displays to their approved aircraft flight
manuals and pilot’s operating handbooks (NTSB, 2010).
With these changes, the NTSB has determined that
significant improvements in safety and reductions in
accidents associated with glass cockpit aircraft can be
achieved.
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While the NTSB study provides valuable information
related to the safety of glass cockpit-equipped aircraft, it is
important to understand that the findings may not be
applicable to a training environment like the subject
university’s flight department. David Ison (2010) suggests
that the NTSB report compares ‘‘apples to oranges.’’ Ison
supports this claim by stating that ‘‘glass airplanes are
generally flown farther than conventional aircraft, deal with
different weather conditions, are typically flown by a
different pilot cohort, and tend to be used less for
instructional flights than round dial types.’’ It is imperative
that the differences in typical operations be taken into
account when comparing accident data of glass cockpit
equipped aircraft with conventional aircraft. The NTSB
findings provide a good background of safety issues related
to glass cockpit equipped aircraft, but readers must fully
understand the difficulties in comparing the accidents of
TAAs, like the SR20, to conventional aircraft such as the
PA28-161.
Cognitive Mismatch with Advanced Systems
A study by Baxter, Besnard, and Riley (2007) focuses on
the risks associated with glass cockpit-equipped aircraft and
examines the ‘‘cognitive mismatch’’ of automated systems
and glass cockpits with their human counterparts. Their
analysis explains how a pilot’s inability to understand how
the system is working and predict what it will do next can
lead to an aircraft accident. The main focus of this
examination is errors in the way flight crews in transport
category aircraft perceive information presented in a glass
cockpit environment, but the findings can be applied to
general aviation aircraft with digital displays as well. The
report found that blame for misinterpretation of digital
instrumentation is due in large part to differences in the
way humans think and differences in the way systems
present data. This disagreement between mind and machine
is defined as a cognitive mismatch. Baxter, Besnard, and
Riley (2007) identify two types of mismatch, real and
perceived:
Real mismatch occurs when there is an actual dis-
crepancy between the pilot’s mental model and the way
that the system operates. This state of affairs is normally
indicative of a flaw in the pilot’s mental mode. A
perceived mismatch occurs when the pilots perceive that
there is an actual discrepancy between their mental
model and the way that the system operates, when in
reality there is not. In other words, this is state of affairs
represents a false alarm. (Baxter et al., 2007)
Their study concludes by explaining that cognitive
mismatches with aircraft systems should be a major
concern and pilots flying an aircraft with a glass cockpit
should be aware of possible errors. There is no single
solution to the problem, and the best defense against
cognitive mismatch is a pilot’s understanding of how a
system works and how data is presented. While the focus of
this research is on instrument and system misinterpretations
in multi-crew, transport category aircraft, cognitive mis-
match is also a concern for pilots of light glass cockpit-
equipped aircraft like the SR20. The study suggests that
there could be a greater chance for cognitive mismatch
when pilots fly multiple types of aircraft with different
digital displays. Different digital avionics platforms may
operate and display information incongruously, making it
possible for pilots to misinterpret data. For example, there
are operational differences in Avidyne and Garmin glass
cockpit suites typically used in advanced light aircraft.
Proficiency in their particular glass cockpit aircraft helps
pilots defend against a cognitive mismatch (Baxter et al.,
2007).
Flight Training
Since university flight departments are primarily respon-
sible for comprehensive flight training, it is critical to
develop an understanding of risks associated with operating
glass cockpit equipped aircraft. Michael Friday studied the
opinions of designated pilot examiners (DPEs) performing
flight evaluations in glass cockpit equipped aircraft. Friday
surveyed a sample of DPEs to determine if they ‘‘perceive a
problem with the current private pilot certification process
with respect to the operation of [advanced display
technology (ADT)] that could have a negative impact on
aircraft safety’’ (Friday, 2011). Friday’s survey revealed that
69% of DPEs feel that ADT created additional risk-taking
behavior by pilots, which negatively impacted safety. This
finding included flying in ‘‘lower visibility, hazardous
weather, lower altitudes, closer to terrain, or closer to other
aircraft’’ (Friday, 2011). The interviewed DPEs felt that the
increase in risk taking behavior was the result of
complacency, reliance on the technology, and the failure of
the pilot to maintain awareness of their surroundings.
A study by John Di Renzo Jr. examined transition training
from technically advanced aircraft to regional airline
training. An interesting finding from this study is that 18
to 21 year olds often lack the discipline required to master
high levels of automation (Di Renzo, 2009). The majority of
students enrolled in the subject university flight program fall
into this category. This finding suggests that those flight
students may face more than normal difficulty when learning
to fly in glass cockpit-equipped aircraft. Failure to gain an
adequate understanding of advanced aircraft systems, such
as the SR20’s G1000 avionics, can result in higher levels of
risk, increasing the chances of accidents.
Flight instructors often promote experience and currency
as the best defense against accidents in technically advanced
aircraft (Wallace, 2010; Hopkins, 2007). Those instructors
argue that being proficient with the operation of glass
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cockpits found in TAAs will increase pilot awareness of
errors in instrument interpretation and improper data entry.
Lapsed proficiency in the aircraft’s automation can lead to
being surprised by the automated system’s operations and
response to pilot input (Sarter & Woods, 1997).
Federal Aviation Administration Initiatives
In 2002, Robert Wright, a manager in the General
Aviation and Commercial Division at the FAA, authored a
white paper discussing the future of general aviation flight
operations. Wright noted that a plateau in aircraft accidents
along with advances in the National Airspace System and
avionics calls for increased attention from the FAA
(Wright, 2002). Wright predicted that further development
of cockpit systems and avionics would necessitate
improved flight training standards (Wright, 2002).
To address some of the concerns raised in Wright’s white
paper, the FAA developed FAA/Industry Training Standards
(FITS). FITS is designed to reduce the number of general
aviation accidents through the use of proven concepts in
system safety for training in TAA (Federal Aviation
Administration, n.d.). FITS uses scenario-based training
encompassing risk management, aeronautical decision-
making, situational awareness, and single-pilot resource
management (Federal Aviation Administration, n.d.). Pilot
training and aircraft types have changed very little over the
course of aviation. Significant changes to avionics and
aircraft systems have only been developed in recent years.
FITS aims to aid instructors in teaching their students
advanced systems often found in TAAs. The program is
designed to adapt to changes as technology develops and
aircraft systems advance (Federal Aviation Administration,
n.d.). Implementing FITS into the subject university’s flight
curriculum would be beneficial and reduce the risks
associated with flying technically advanced aircraft.
Methodology
The National Transportation Safety Board’s Aviation
Database was used as a data source for this study. The
query function of the database allows users to specify a
wide range of criteria such as aircraft type, timeframe,
injury severity, and report status. For this project, the
following search criteria were used:
Event Start Date: 09/01/2001
Event End Date: 09/01/2011
Investigation Type: Accident
Injury Severity: Fatal
Aircraft Make: Cirrus and Piper
Aircraft Model: SR20 and PA28-161
Report Status: Probable Cause
The search criteria yielded the data necessary to
complete this study. The NTSB identification number,
accident date, time of day, aircraft model, pilot age, pilot
rating, pilot medical class, pilot total time, pilot total time in
aircraft type, aircraft Hobbs time, meteorological informa-
tion, and probable cause including the contributing factor
and actual cause were all recorded in a database.
Information that was not available in an NTSB report
was left blank in the database.
An affinity diagram was chosen as the best tool to
categorize and sort the data. Affinity diagrams allow for the
‘‘organization of large volumes of information efficiently
and [identification of] natural patterns or grouping in the
information’’ (Evans & Lindsay, 2011, p. 204). After data
was collected, NVivo 9 analysis software was used to
categorize and group the data. Tools in NVivo 9 were used
to organize the data and identify commonalities in probable
cause and contributing factors to accidents across air-
frames. The word frequency function was used to identify
the most common phrases in the probable cause and
contributing factors of accidents for SR20 and PA28-161
aircraft. The parameters were set to search for matches of
all words including synonyms. By using NVivo 9 to assist
in the creation of an affinity diagram, the probable cause
buckets were identified as pilot failure, mechanical
malfunction, and environmental conditions. The contribut-
ing factors buckets were identified as loss of directional
control, midair collision, collision with terrain, mechanical
failure, and deviation from instrument procedures.
Next, Pareto diagrams were used to graphically present
the data. A Pareto diagram was chosen because it
graphically depicts how often the buckets contribute to
accidents and their relative frequency to other contributors
(Evans & Lindsay, 2011, p. 551). In total, four Pareto
diagrams were created, each graphically presenting data for
probable cause and contributing factors across airframes. It
is important to note that often times many factors contribute
to the same accident. To accurately represent all aspects of
probable cause and contributing factors of an accident,
some may be recorded twice under different criteria. A
graphical representation will allow decision makers to
visually identify areas that need the most attention to
improve safety. The bars in the Pareto charts represent
frequency in descending order while the red line represents
the cumulative percentage.
Finally, bar charts were created to compare the relative
frequency of probable cause and contributing factors
between SR20 and PA28-161 aircraft. These charts allow
flight department decision makers to pinpoint differences in
risk between the two airframes. From this, a list of
recommendations was compiled to help mitigate the risk
and address new levels of risk associated with SR20 aircraft.
Research Limitations
This study is intended to help university decision makers
identify differences in risks between SR20 and PA28-161
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aircraft. It is important to note that the subject university
uses SR20 and PA28-161 aircraft in training environments.
While there are some circumstances of training-related fatal
accidents recorded in the NTSB database used for this
study, the majority of the accident data is unrelated to
training. It is more common for a TAA to be involved in an
accident while being flown for business or personal use as
opposed to training. The conclusions of this study are also
based on a few assumptions. For the purposes of this study,
it is assumed that all aircraft are maintained airworthy and
all pilots are current as required by regulation. This study
did not take aircraft age into account. Data was collected
from accidents over the past ten years without regard to
aircraft age. Mechanical malfunction rates related to
probable cause may be slightly higher for PA28-161
aircraft because they are typically older aircraft when
compared to the SR20. Pilot qualifications were not
considered but were available in the database. The database
often provided insufficient and incomplete data on airmen,
bringing the usefulness and relevance of pilot qualifications
into question for this study. Finally, number of accidents
per flight hour for each aircraft was not taken into account.
This study examined accidents over a ten-year period
without regard to accidents per flight hour. At the time of
this research, that data was unavailable and the researcher
determined that the aforementioned methodology would be
sufficient for the purposes of this study.
Results
The data was categorized and presented in Pareto charts.
Figures 1 and 2 represent probable cause of fatal accidents
over the past ten years in the United States in SR20 and
PA28-161 aircraft respectively. Figure 3 is a comparison of
the relative frequency of accident causes between SR20 and
PA28-161 aircraft.
The most common probable cause of SR20 and PA28-
161 fatal accidents over the past ten years in the United
States was the pilot’s failure to safely operate an aircraft.
This category represents any failure on the part of the pilot
that led to an accident and can be equated to the term ‘pilot
error’. Environmental conditions were the second most
common probable cause in fatal aircraft accidents in SR20
aircraft and the third most common probable cause in fatal
accidents in PA28-161 aircraft. This category represents
aircraft accidents as a result of any environmental
conditions. Finally, mechanical malfunctions did not cause
any accidents in SR20 aircraft but was the second leading
probable cause of fatal accidents in PA28-161 aircraft.
Comparison between the two aircraft types in Figure 3
indicates that pilot failure and mechanical function were
more common in PA28-161 fatal accidents while environ-
mental conditions were the probable cause in more SR20
fatal accidents.
Figures 4 and 5 represent the frequency of contributing
factors to SR20 and PA28-161 fatal accidents in the United
States over the past ten years, respectively. Figure 6 is a
comparison of the contributing factors to accidents between
SR20 and PA28-161 aircraft.
The analysis of contributing factors determined that loss
of directional control was the primary contributing factor to
fatal accidents in both aircraft types followed by collision
with terrain. Deviation from instrument procedures was the
Figure 1. Pareto chart representing probable cause of fatal accidents
involving SR20 aircraft in the United States over the past ten years.
Figure 2. Pareto chart representing probable cause of fatal accidents
involving PA28-161 aircraft in the United States over the past ten years.
Figure 3. Comparison of the relative frequency of fatal accidents probable
causes between SR20 and PA28-161 aircraft.
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third most common contributing factor to fatal accidents in
SR20 aircraft but did not contribute to any PA28-161
accidents. Midair collision is fourth in the list of
contributing factors to fatal accidents for both aircraft
types. Finally, mechanical failures did not contribute to any
SR20 aircraft accidents, but was the third contributing
cause of fatal accidents in PA28-161 aircraft. Comparison
of the relative frequency of contributing factors to fatal
accidents between both aircraft is graphed in Figure 6.
Discussion
From this analysis, it was determined that pilot error was
more frequently the cause of fatal accidents involving
PA28-161 aircraft over the past ten years when compared
to SR20 aircraft. This result would suggest that the hypothesis
of there being a greater percentage of accidents as a result of
pilot error in the SR20, when compared to the PA28-161, due
to its advanced avionics suite is false. This finding may be the
result of multiple factors. One reason for this could be that
more experienced pilots fly the SR20 aircraft when compared
to PA28-161 aircraft. Only recently have flight schools and
universities adopted SR20 aircraft and other TAAs as primary
trainers. On the same note, aircraft such as PA28-161s are
more frequently employed in all training environments. The
relative experience of operators could account for the higher
levels of pilot error with PA28-161s.
The study only recorded data on SR20 and PA28-161
aircraft, narrowing the focus to two specific airframes. Further
study is recommended to determine if the findings occur
across a population of all TAAs compared to all conventional
aircraft. The findings of this study, however, suggest NTSB
studies of TAA accident rates, relative to conventional light
aircraft, are accurate. A more in-depth study should be
completed at a later date, after TAAs in structured training
environments are more commonly employed.
Conclusion
Technically advanced aircraft such as the Cirrus SR20
are the future of global aviation as automated systems and
glass cockpit displays become more prevalent in light
aircraft. As flight training fleets are converted to TAAs, it is
important for students and instructors alike to understand
the risks associated with these advanced aircraft. While the
findings of this study may not identify specific risks
associated with the SR20 aircraft, they suggest the most
common causes of accidents when compared to the PA28-
161. As the subject university and other flight schools gain
experience operating TAAs as primary trainers, specific
safety measures and program modifications should be put
in place to reduce risk and minimize the chances of
incidents and accidents during flight operations.
Some preliminary recommendations have been compiled
based on the findings of this study to ensure continued high
levels of safety in flight departments that operate TAAs:
1. Implement TAA-specific accident and incident pre-
vention measures.
2. Improve department-wide incident reporting to better
track and assess risks associated with new TAA fleet.
3. Stress ‘looking outside the aircraft’ in visual
meteorological conditions.
Figure 4. Pareto chart of representing contributing factors to fatal accidents
involving SR20 aircraft in the United States over the past ten years.
Figure 5. Pareto chart of representing contributing factors to fatal accidents
involving SR20 aircraft in the United States over the past ten years.
Figure 6. Comparison of the relative frequency of fatal accidents
contributors between SR20 and PA28-161 aircraft.
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4. Discuss levels of automation and techniques to
mitigate risk during periods of high workloads.
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